There must be very few people, diplomats, politicians or journalists, who were not taken by surprise at ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier’s sudden appearance in Haiti, and there can only be speculation as to whether the Government of France, in which Duvalier had been residing, itself knew. If it did not know, this itself would itself be something of an intelligence lapse. The Government of Haiti has conceded that it had no power to prevent the ex-President from returning to the country. And though President Preval has indicated that he will be subject to legal proceedings concerning his conduct of office during his presidency, the Haitian population will probably be taking with a grain of salt that such a possibility will come to a conclusion satisfactory to them.
The government has conceded that nothing inhibits former President Aristide from returning to Haiti, since the constitution does not give a Haitian government the authority to send persons into exile in the first place. But the point is moot, since in circumstances such as the departures of both Duvalier and Aristide, there was really no viable government in the country. So the present circumstances can only serve as a reminder to the citizens of the country of the extent to which, since the death of the senior Duvalier, external influences have predominantly regulated the terms of dismissal and exile of their leaders.
The question in most governments’ minds will certainly be, what next? But in a sense that question is irrelevant if there is an implication that Baby Doc’s re-entry can, on its own, cause a reversion to political confusion. More to the point, on the assumption that Aristide’s political following and influence is much greater today than that of Duvalier, is the question of whether Aristide will seek to return, and what capabilities he will have to create a situation in which he can decisively influence events in the present period. The OAS has called for the replacement of candidate Jude Celestin by candidate Michel Martelly, but there is also the suggestion by others that the whole election should be re-run.
In the circumstances, the governments of the international community represented by the UN and OAS missions would most likely want to see the elections rerun as quickly as possible, if some kind of consensus can be organized within Haiti. But in doing so, they would have to ensure that even more stringent security measures are in place to permit an environment for relatively normal voting, in the face of dissatisfaction from Duvaleriste and Aristide forces.
A difficulty in the present situation would appear to be the relatively inactive stance taken by President Preval, who seems to be intent on taking as few decisions as he can before he leaves office. Preval may see himself as a realist, to the extent of recognizing that, but for the possibility of mass protest, those who control the security forces on the ground are the ones who will determine the decisions to be taken about the next elections.
In that connection, there would appear to be some indication that Caricom, locked into the international management system for Haiti’s normalization reflected in the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Patterson-Clinton structure, does not feel completely comfortable about the pace of progress towards normalization. It was unlikely that a relatively equable balance in terms of decision-implementation could have been achieved between the United States and Caricom. For though Haiti is a full member of Caricom, the priorities and costs of reconstruction limit its influence, leaving the region virtually accepting that he who pays the piper calls the tune. In addition, Caricom has to recognize the role which Haiti’s immediate neighbour, the Dominican Republic, has grasped for itself in the present situation, often taking a leading position in initiatives towards Haiti with the not unreasonable excuse that major problems arising from Haitian migration and the cholera epidemic that is plaguing the country, place it in the most precarious situation of all Caricom and hemispheric states.
The earthquake has, of course, diverted Caricom from what was its major previous preoccupation, that of defining the terms, and creating the on-the-ground circumstances, for a meaningful integration of Haiti into the Caricom Single Market and Economy. But there is some indication too, that the Dominican Republic would like to use the present environment to also define new terms for a relationship with Haiti, continuing its own dynamic initiatives relating to the Free Trade Area of the Americas and the possibility that it can use a Haiti-DR relationship in the medium term to influence its continuing objective towards a more meaningful relationship with Caricom as a whole.
In such a process, it will undoubtedly have the support of the European Union, anxious to rationalize its relationship with Caricom in the post Economic Partnership Agreement
So, for Caricom, it might well be best that while playing its part in the post-earthquake and electioneering process in Haiti, we also spend some time thinking deeply about the evolution of relations in the Greater Antilles, now referred to as the Northern Caribbean, as the reconstruction process itself induces hemispheric countries and the European Union, to rethink their relationships not in terms of Caricom, but a new post-Caricom configuration more strongly influenced by countries like the DR and a reconstructing Cuba.
All this may seem far-fetched, but it is best to prepare for the seemingly impossible.
