The announcement of a changing of the guard in Havana – albeit not for another five years – has been somewhat overshadowed by all the fuss over the death of President Hugo Chávez and the election of Pope Francis. But the identification of a successor to Fidel and Raúl Castro in Cuba, although relatively lacking in drama, is still momentous news.
It will be recalled that on February 24, Miguel Díaz-Canel was named First Vice-president of Cuba’s Council of State, making him President Raúl Castro’s number two and the man most likely to succeed him when he steps down in 2018. In the context of, first, Fidel ruling from 1959 to 2006 and, since then, Raúl, when illness forced Fidel to pass the baton of power to his younger brother, it was a significant moment in the history of revolutionary, Castro-ite Cuba. Raúl called it a moment of “historic transcendence.”
But who exactly is Miguel Díaz-Canel, a man who even appears to be something of an unknown quantity within Cuba and is little known outside of the island, only relatively recently rising to prominence with repeated appearances on state television and, in January, speaking at a pro-Chávez rally in Venezuela and accompanying the Cuban President to the CELAC Summit in Chile?
Perhaps the most telling factor is the age of the new heir apparent. He was born on April 20, 1960, after the Revolution, and will be 58 if and when he takes over as President of Cuba in 2018. The Cuban leadership seems at last to have recognised the limits of their gerontocracy, even if Raúl Castro will be almost 87 when he is supposed to retire. Clearly, though, Mr Díaz-Canel represents a generational transition in Cuba and all indications point to him being groomed over the next five years to ensure the “orderly transfer of key roles to new generations,” as explained by President Castro.
It is not, however, as if youth has not previously been given a chance in Cuba. Other high-fliers of Mr Díaz-Canel’s generation, such as Roberto Robaina and Felipe Pérez Roque, who between them held the foreign ministry from 1993 to 2009, and Carlos Lage, former Vice-president of the Council of State, fell out of favour and suffered political defenestration. But Mr Díaz-Canel’s rise, in contrast, has been comparatively low-key.
According to an Associated Press report, he “has spent 30 years gradually paying his dues behind the scenes, earning a reputation as a Communist Party loyalist and rising through the ranks to a succession of ever-higher posts.” His breakthrough year came in 2003, when he was elevated, still relatively young, to the Politburo of the Party. He then served as Minister of Higher Education from 2009 to 2012, when he was promoted to the post of Vice-president of the Council of Ministers.
Now, it is difficult, if not impossible, to foresee what change he will represent if he survives Cuba’s unpredictable political machinations. Undoubtedly, Cuba-watchers will be monitoring his every word and move to try to determine whether he is really as he appears – a smart but colourless, party apparatchik, regarded as a safe pair of hands by the Castros and the revolutionary old guard, entrusted with managing the transition begun by Raúl Castro. But this may be precisely why he is Raúl’s chosen one, for Raúl himself was regarded as colourless and pragmatic, as opposed to his elder brother’s charismatic and idealistic style of leadership.
As to whether Mr Díaz-Canel will usher in a brave new world for Cuba, only time will tell. In the meantime, he is not expected to do anything radical, Party loyalist that he is and in the full knowledge that it is the Politburo that will decide Raúl’s successor with every intention of ensuring the survival of the Revolution.
