The Middle East and its environs has remained a centre of concern of the major powers, in particular the United States. As civil war in Syria continues, Western diplomats look nervously at what seems to be a temporary stalemate between the Turkish government of Erdogan and a restless population; how the rising confrontation between a Shia-led government in Iraq indicates the possibility of increasing intensity of a coming Shia-Sunni struggle for power; and at Israel’s probes here and there in the region in a continuing effort to minimize the effects of Arab support for a resolution of the Palestine issue.
Egypt has been long sustained by the Americans, particularly since President Sadat arrived at a peace agreement with Israel, and has been seen by the US as the fulcrum of its efforts to stabilize the area, and to inhibit any sudden eruption of confrontation. But the country has now itself become a centre of domestic turmoil. And the Americans find that after billions of dollars of aid, focused on ensuring the stability of the Egyptian army, its main client has itself become, not a stabilizer of the Egyptian or Middle Eastern arenas, but one of the protagonists in the struggle for supremacy within the state.
The Americans have determined that General Abdul Fattah el-Sisi’s grab for power in the face of an inexperienced Muslim Brotherhood government’s attempt to confine the reins of power to itself, was not merited, and that the General and his army have closed off the hoped-for possibilities for progressively pressuring the Muslimists into sharing power within a democratic framework. And surprised by the resistance of the army, their response has been a half-hearted suspension of economic aid to Egypt, while simultaneously fearing the consequences of suspending the over a billion dollars of military aid on which the power and supremacy of the Egyptian army rests.
In that situation, the President of the United States seems paralysed, as the Americans’ main hope for muting the power of the armed forces with a mediated solution that would temper the Muslimists’ inclination to close off access to decision-making power to itself has failed. The resignation of the ostensibly liberal Mohammed ElBaradei, known globally for his work at the International Atomic Energy Agency, has removed the veneer of constitutionalism from the post-elections, and then post-Morsi regime, now seen as no more than a face card for military rule, over which it obviously has no leverage.
The rulers of the variety of regimes in the area have lined up for and against, but now mostly for, the military regime, seeing it as, at least, a temporary cover for dealing with the Muslimists, and because it is assumed the military can be persuaded to return to the barracks after a civilian constitutional face can be consolidated.
The attitude of the United States now seems to be wait-and-see. Their hope will be that after a period of stabilization of the pro-Morsi forces, some form of election can be arranged that will function under the overarching, watching eye of the army, seen as retaining some form of constitutional legitimacy.
What the Americans must be concerned about, however, is how little General Fattah el-Sisi has bothered to heed their indications of concern, in spite of the army’s dependence on US military assistance; and how he appears to be unconcerned about the announcement of the suspension of economic aid. The General, of course, will have noted how rapidly the conservative monarchies led by Saudi Arabia, came to his assistance with a promise of billions of dollars of support; and he will be calculating that they will be able to count, at least on the diplomatic support of Egypt, in the continuing struggle for power in Syria.
In that regard, there would appear to be arising a temporary alliance between those conservative, traditionally pro-American regimes, and the interests of Israel in cramping the strength of Muslimist forces in the area as a whole, including the Hamas in Palestine.
What seems clear at present is that American diplomacy itself seems to be cramped, since it has, for some time, placed as a priority the maintenance of Egypt, especially since the Egypt-Israel agreement signed by Sadat, as its key ally and diplomatic stabilizer of the Middle East. But the power of Egypt is now almost paralleled, if not superseded, by that of Saudi Arabia, whose influence is demonstrated not so much through attempts at diplomatic manoeuvring, but rather through the strategic disposition of its financial resources.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia now find themselves as allies, leading the conservative forces in the struggle against what they would consider extremist Muslimism. But the military rulers and the Americans, have to come to terms with the fact that a stifling of the Muslimists, claiming now to represent the real nationalism of the country, is unlikely to be maintained in the way and for the tenure, that Anwar Sadat and Mubarak were able to do.
The spectre of the rise of the religious nationalists in Iran, and the fact that, when the time came, the US was unable to prevent their rise, must be very much in the forefront of American thinking presently. And in that regard, though the context is the virtual opposite of what occurred in Iran, United States diplomacy seems, as it did at the point of the overthrow of the Shah, to be somewhat paralysed.
