Unlikely that ‘rules of careful English’ has become a principle of statutory interpretation

Dear Editor,

Sherwood Lowe in a letter to the editor (‘Acting CJ’s interpretation ignores…’ SN, Feb 22) refers to the “rules of careful English” as a principle of statutory interpretation. His contention is that Chief Justice (ag) Chang’s interpretation of Article 160 (3) (a) (v) ignored “the rules of careful English, rendering the ruling on Felix and Scott erroneous.” Is “rules of careful English” a principle of statutory interpretation?

Professor Driedger in The Construction of Statutes states that “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act and the intention of Parliament” (1974). This modern approach, as it is referred to, has become the Supreme Court of Canada’s preferred approach to statutory interpretation. It has been deployed widely in all areas of law including the interpretation of constitutional texts.

It would be interesting to analyze the decision, if only to shed clarity on the doctrine of interpretation employed. I doubt that “rules of careful English” has become a principle of statutory interpretation.

Yours faithfully,

Kowlasar Misir

Canada