A commission admitting hearsay evidence in relation to the involvement of anyone is restricted to facts admissible under the Evidence Act

Dear Editor,

In a letter by Mr Mohabir Anil Nandlall published in the Stabroek News of 27th February, headlined: ‘Hearsay evidence inadmissible in a court can be received in an inquiry,’ Mr Nandlall stated: “Regarding the evidence it is trite law that the rules of evidence applicable to a court of law in litigation do not apply to Commissions of Inquiry. This is a universal principle…”

A Commission of Inquiry appointed to make findings of fact is permitted to admit hearsay evidence. However, the commission is obliged when considering the question of the involvement of anyone, to restrict itself to the facts admissible under the Evidence Act and the common law of England.

Professor Keeton in a study of the functioning of the Tribunals of Inquiry Act in England 1921, in his Treatise Trial by Tribunal (1960) said: “In sifting the facts concerning the existence of rumours giving rise to the inquiry, all evidence is relevant and this part of the inquiry is simply fact-finding. When the question of the involvement of a particular person in a particular transaction is under consideration, however, the Tribunal restricts itself to the facts admissible under the normal rule of evidence.”

If a commission were permitted to condemn anyone on hearsay evidence without applying the normal rule of evidence it would be a return to the tyranny of the Court of the Star Chamber which had become synonymous with the misuse and abuse of power.

There is no dispute that a Commission of Inquiry is not a court and its proceedings are not judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative, nevertheless the rules of fairness and fair play must be observed.

In Re Pergamon Press Ltd (1970) 3 WLR 792 Lord Denning said: “Seeing that their work and their report may lead to such consequences, I am clearly of the opinion that the inspectors must act fairly. This is a duty which rests on them, as on many other bodies, even though they are not judicial, nor quasi-judicial, but only administrative…”

In the same case, Sachs LJ said: “It seems to me… very clear that in the conduct of the proceedings there must be displayed that measure of natural justice … the Inspector’s duty, in their statutory fact-finding capacity to produce a report which may be made public and thus cause severe injury to an individual by its findings”.

Yours faithfully,
Rex H McKay, SC