The current economic difficulties of Brazil, now expanded into political challenges to the government, as well as specifically to President Dilma Rousseff herself, suggest a change in perceptions of the status not only of Brazil in the ranking of economies in the global system, but the ranking of countries described some years ago by a Western analyst as BRICS, with the implication that they could become among the more select groupings of leading global economies as time goes on.
Naturally the domestic economic and political affairs of Brazil will be of greater interest to us on the South American mainland, though, with Guyana’s longstanding interest and participation in developing countries’ relations, and those relations with the larger powers, proximity will not be the only reason for such interest.
When the term BRICS was invented and achieved prominence, it was clearly an attempt to examine the extent to which some developing countries would, by dint of the rapidity of the growth of their economies, as well as their significance in geopolitical terms, achieve a status of necessary, or relevant, participants in discussions on global economic affairs in particular. And at first, as is now well known, the group was deemed to included Brazil, Russia, India and China, with South Africa being subsequently added.
The term too, by its very inclusion of Russia, can be said to have had a post-Cold War ring, the inclusion of that country removing any suggestion that, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the country could be automatically ranked, any more, among a select small group determining affairs separately with the United States, the Soviet Union’s former Cold War partner-antagonist. And indeed, it represented a portrayal of Russia as lined up, in terms of the pursuit of economic growth, with the market-related options exercised by the post-Cold War major economic powers
Further, the grouping of selected BRICS, defined specifically in economic terms, was, in a sense, not intended to have the automatic status of functioning as a major, cohesive, geopolitical participant determining the orientation of global affairs; though there was some suggestion that the members constituted major actors in their various regions, and that some of them could be seen as representative of developing country opinion, particularly on economic matters, in their specific zones.
It is in that sense, that the inclusion of Brazil will have been welcomed by the countries of this hemisphere, and in particular by the Caricom members of the South American continent, as indicating an achievement of a degree of status among the major countries of the globe, capable of representing Caricom opinion, at a minimum on economic development affairs, at the level of the global powers. Guyana and Suriname, as continental members of Caricom could, utilizing a sophisticated diplomacy, have a messenger, so to speak, capable of carrying the region’s perspectives when the larger global economic powers assembled.
It is from that perspective that current political and economic events in Brazil can hardly come as welcome news to Guyana and other Caricom states. Brazil’s high point in international affairs was reached under the two-term presidency of former President Lula, carrying on the achievement of consistent economic growth initiated by his predecessor, two-term President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, while taking Brazil into a closer set of Third World relationships and support of developing country economic policy options at the international level, than his predecessor did.
There can be little doubt about the persistence of the investigation of Brazilian economic affairs while the country was led by Lula. But this has been compounded by the difficulties which his successor, President Rousseff, has had in providing the country with a continuing, viable, set of economic policies, in the face of a wider global recession that has diminished the exports of the country’s agricultural and other products in particular.
This has led to a persistent diminution of President Rousseff’s popularity, as indicated in the last presidential elections in 2014; and this, in turn resulted in a diminished majority for her party in the last elections. And the consequence has been, first her seeming inability to hold the ranks of her party and related allies together, as, in accordance with the country’s constitution, the judicial authorities have persisted in their investigations, at a time when the President’s support in the parliament has become increasingly fragile.
At home, therefore, Rousseff has appeared to lose her control not only of her allies in the Parliament who it appears, observing the fragility of her situation, as well as her seeming inability to engage in maintaining parliamentary relationships, seem to have left her in a stand-alone situation as the judicial authorities have pursued their investigations of past behaviour.
In the sphere of the country’s international relations, the President, almost from her assumption of office, seems to have chosen to take a stance towards the United States which has not suggested a willingness to pursue some degree of complementarity with the policies and initiatives of President Obama. And as he in turn, felt obliged to remark on Rousseff’s visit to Washington in June 2015, “no relationship between countries is without disagreements”.
It cannot be said that the President has been persistently engaged in relations with other BRICS as her concentration has had to be on domestic affairs, now complicated by the judicial authorities to advance their investigation of the personal behaviour of her mentor Lula while in office, and an obvious determination to tackle her own behaviour.
At the international level, the BRICS, as a grouping appear less cohesive and active, for if truth be told, President Putin of Russia is substantially engaged both in reconstructing his country’s domestic economic relationships internally, in the face of external efforts of isolation; and with conducting a policy aimed at negating related diplomatic possible isolation by the Western powers.
It is difficult, at this point, to determine the direction, over the rest of this year, of the extent to which opposition forces in Brazil will succeed in forcing a loss of support for the President in the Parliament, particularly as former President Lula has now been forced to concentrate on his own difficulties, and pressures exerted against him by the judicial authorities.
In that context, it appears that any diplomatic efforts aimed at holding the objectives of the BRICS together, will hardly be a priority for Brazil. And while it is the case that Brazilian diplomacy has had a certain stability, irrespective of governmental or party orientation, the dynamism that small countries like ours can expect in terms of those sympathetic to our orientations, is not likely to have a substantial visibility.
