As reported in this newspaper over the weekend, the increasing turmoil against the government of President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela has received the attention of other governments of Latin America. The attention of Pope Francis, himself a Latin American, among other things, has legitimized wider regional attention, as indicated by the observations made by the President of Peru, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, at the Ibero-American summit in Cartagena, Colombia on Saturday.
Kuczynski has given what would be an appropriate title, that of a ‘crisis of both political and human rights’ to the path which the conflict between government and large numbers of people in Venezuela has taken. And the diplomatic intervention of both Pope Francis and some Latin American governments means that Maduro, to the extent that he obviously now feels that he cannot autonomously contain the crisis, has had to provide the appropriate avenues for such external diplomatic interventions.
In effect that gradually worsening political contention, both induced and aggravated by a long-term economic crisis which the government has not been able to cope with, has led President Maduro to seek the assistance of the Pope, initially, no doubt, as a way of containing the hostility of the opposition now facing him.
The suggestion of a necessary diplomatic intervention of other Latin American governments, and in particular the statements by President Kuczynski over the weekend has now received the support of the various factions and parties in Venezuela. But they are anxious to ensure that it does not lead to a stalemate that supports the continuing rule of Maduro under the present conditions which they so strongly oppose.
The precise issues receiving the attention of other Latin American governments will, of course have to be accepted by both the Venezuelan government and the various contending parties, and, we would expect, would have the attention of Pope Francis, given that his original intervention has been virtually invited by President Maduro, in respect of a country which has a substantial Roman Catholic presence.
Naturally, Caricom governments will have a continuing interest, indeed a virtual self-interest in the outcome of any attempts at mediation. Guyana, pre-eminently, will continue to be perturbed by the unrest in its neighbour, and will obviously be interested to see whether external matters, by which we mean the boundary controversy, tend in any way to become a part of the government’s effort of diversion from this domestic issue.
And similarly, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, long a place of refuge and repose for Venezuelans, will be concerned to closely observe the extent of any further developing abnormality in the civil dispute that encourages continually increasing migration to their country.
But as many observers can easily intuit, as recipients of the PetroCaribe Initiative and agreement, originally introduced by President Hugo Chávez, almost every Caricom government involved in this regional arrangement will already have been closely perusing the potential effects of what is a formal economic agreement between themselves and the Government of Venezuela which has played such a substantial part in the stabilization of their own economies in periods of international oil prices instability.
Depending on how the crisis evolves, the Peruvian president should have a certain legitimacy in seeking to assist any process of normalizing the present crisis, especially as Brazil has itself been preoccupied with the results of the removal of then President Dilma Rousseff, and in spite of the fact that the country has a substantial and stable diplomatic system.
We should also observe that even though the government of the United States will obviously be closely watching the events, and in spite of the fact that it does not have the substantial economic presence in the country that its own businesses once had, it is likely that its diplomacy in this respect will be somewhat muted in this election period.
For even though he is not a candidate for the presidency, it is probably the case that any public hint of an American diplomatic manouevre by President Obama, will induce criticism by the Republican candidate Donald Trump of apparent recent lack of public interest in the political evolution of a country with which it has previously had a long involvement, both in terms of political and economic affairs.
Nonetheless, we can also be certain that Venezuela continues to be perceived by American diplomacy as a strategically significant country in the hemisphere. And it is probably the case that a present perception is, that to the extent that the civil conflict does not take the form of intense domestic physical conflict between people and government, or between different factions of government and opposition forces, American diplomacy should concern itself with initiatives of the other hemispheric states.
President Kuczynski, a professional economist who had a longstanding practice in the United States and in international financial organizations and activities, had a substantial public reputation prior to his entry into political life. We can therefore be certain that diplomatic intercourse between the US and his government is intense, while President Obama seeks to contain domestic conflict about international affairs at this time.
We cannot assume that there would be any substantial domestic welcome for external forces in Venezuela. But we surely must hope that the outcome of diplomatic intervention, which, given the hostility between the various groupings and the government in Venezuela, calms the situation in what is, in both economic and diplomatic terms, a country of strategic significance for us.
In this aspect, governments of other countries on this continent, and those in the Caricom region, will share that interest with us.
