Europe’s illiberal future

Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 essay on “The End of History” argued that America’s Cold War victory had left  “no serious ideological competitors” to liberal democracy and the “universalization of Western liberal democracy [was] the final form of human government.” As the world settled into democratic norms, peace and commerce would displace traditional tribal and national interests. Pressing the conjecture even further, Fukuyama insisted: “The argument then is not so much that liberal democracy constrains man’s natural instincts for aggression and violence, but that it has fundamentally transformed the instincts themselves and eliminated the motive for imperialism.”

The last decade has not been kind to this thesis. Public trust in institutions has plummeted within mature democracies and populist parties have scored a series of upset election victories. What used to be fringe parties have taken centre stage in formerly liberal countries and there has been a resurgence of illiberal ethno-nationalist leaders or outright strongmen in Brazil, France, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, the Philippines, Poland, Spain, Turkey, even the United Kingdom and United States.

History’s vengeful return has been evident throughout Brexit, a national saga which has finally ended the premiership of Theresa May. The Times’ political editor attributes her disappointments  to a “complete lack of self-awareness” and many have commented on her charmlessness and modest political instincts. But whatever else might be said of her, May’s perseverance was impressive. She clung to power despite losing an overall majority in the 2017 snap election, facing a no-confidence vote last December, and enduring three humiliating rejections of her plan to separate from Europe. No one who watched her tearful farewell could doubt her ambition, or her reluctance to step aside.

Resurgent populism has not only scuttled the economic integration that was meant to entrench liberal democracy, it has raised serious doubts about the ability of traditional parties to represent the national mood. Britain, a country that used to pride itself on a distinguished record of political tact and reasonable compromises has now devolved into a nonstop political brawl. One sign of the current disarray is that Nigel Farage’s intellectually bankrupt Brexit Party is likely to win the largest share of votes in the recently concluded European Parliament elections. Polls also suggest that May’s Conservatives may even get fewer votes than the Green Party.

The New York Times columnist Richard Cohen recently discussed Europe’s rightward lurch with former Trump strategist Steve Bannon. “Europe is six months to a year ahead of the United States on everything,” said Bannon, and he described Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister, Matteo Salvini, one of the stars of the new right, as “the most important guy on the stage right now — he’s charismatic, plain-spoken, and he understands the machinery of government.” Italy, Bannon suggests, has now become “the center of politics — a country that has embraced nationalism against globalism, shattered the stereotypes, blown past the old paradigm of left and right.” Cohen’s less flattering assessment calls Salvini “a master of saying the unsayable to drown out the rest.”

In many ways the simultaneity of May’s departure and Salvini’s ascendancy echo Angela Merkel’s exit at almost the same time as the election of Jair Bolsonaro. Both sets of events underscore Bannon’s troubling  insight that ours is no longer “an era of persuasion, it’s an era of mobilization. People now move in tribes. Persuasion is highly overrated.” The plodding efforts of seasoned operatives like May are no match for people who can say the unsayable if it promises victory. For anyone with hopes of a liberal resurgence in the US, these developments are, to say the least, an ill-omen for the 2020 elections.