Dear Editor,
I write to acknowledge Mr Ravi Dev’s response to my letter asking him for his opinion on the Indian Ethnic Security Dilemma (IESD). I refer to his letter published in the October 11, 2020 edition of the Sunday Stabroek under the caption, `The Indian Ethnic Security Dilemma is alive and well’.
As was expected Dev was frank and forthwith and provided evidence in support of his contention. He prefaces his response with the following: “ … I wish to place it in context. With oil revenues about to enter the economy, unless the African and Indian Guyanese major ethnic groups, who have been fighting for power since 1955, arrive at a modus vivendi very quickly, we stand in danger of losing “ corn and husk” to the carpetbaggers who will be descending on Guyana like locusts. We should be reminded that locusts leave nothing for others in their wake.” On this observation, I am in full agreement with Dev.
Since I accept Dev’s position that “The Indian Ethnic Security Dilemma is alive and well”, I will instead concentrate my response to his contention that the “African Ethnic Security Dilemma (AESD) has resolved itself.” On this matter I disagree with Ravi Dev. However, his position has relevance since it is premised on an examination of the situation as it is today. Hence we are forced to interrogate the issue based on recent empirical evidence. It is my conviction that the African community’s historical position on its ethnic security dilemma “still stands” since we don’t have the numbers to determine an election outcome in our favour under the present “winner takes all” governance system. Our reliance on ethnic support outside our community is no different than in the past. Our numbers do not permit electoral self-determination. And this is so even with the high level of polarisation.
To support his view that the African Ethnic Security Dilemma (AESD) has resolved itself Dev cited the APNU+AFC victory in the 2015 General and Regional Elections. The logic of Dev’s augment is that change in demographics in the country prevents the PPP/C from winning an election on Indian votes and that the change is significant to allow an African-led coalition to win elections, as was done by the APNU+AFC. He advises African political leadership to invest in good political behaviour and points to the PNC’s conduct which helped the PPP/C to return to office in the 2020 elections. I agree with him on this point. However, a victory of fewer than 5000 votes was objectively a “political slippery slope” as demonstrated by the no-confidence vote. While I concede that “proper political behaviour” by the PNC leadership is necessary for a coalition led by them to gain office, there is no assurance of that outcome. African reliance on votes outside our community for ethnic security, while attractive, is no substitute for constitutional reform and executive power-sharing. It will be remiss of me if I don’t point out that election success is not merely a matter of numbers, but getting those numbers in the ballot boxes. Economics and other social factors played a role in getting votes. Indian economic dominance gives that community and the PPP/C a major advantage in elections, unmatched by Africans. Economic dominance allows for the making of natural political alliances both local and external. For example one of these natural political allies of the PPP/C of recent vintage was the Private Sector Commission with its huge resources and influence at home and abroad.
Now let me turn my attention to the “boogieman” in the political equation, the African dominance in the coercive arms of the state. There is no denying that Africans are in the majority in the army and police force and this gives the African community some political advantage whether we choose to use it intentionally or unintentionally. In terms of electoral politics, our presence in these services has little relevance in Africans winning elections. It has more relevance in the political equation outside election politics and even in this area its importance is often overplayed by Africans and non-Africans, as a guarantee of African Ethnic Security – a hangover from the Burnham period. Post-1992 elections and politics, in general, have been conducted within parameters that render the advantages Africans have by their presence in the coercive arms of the ineffectual. Only when our political confrontations “crosses the line” the above become important.
We must also bear in mind that in the post-Burnham era, the doctrine of the Joint Services has changed towards a commitment to the constitution. And the military unlike that of Fiji has never entered politics stating a commitment to race/ethnic security. The coercive arms of the Guyanese state are also neutralised to a great extent by the influence of the US and Western powers, the United Nations, and international and regional treaties and conventions. Dev’s reference to the “Buxton-based violence” and soldiers’ refusal to go in “hot pursuit” of gunmen is a part of the narrative. The record will show that the police and the army killed or arrested many of those elements while they killed no state-sponsored gunmen. At the end of the day, it was the Joint Services that brought an end to the resistance. In politics, the outcome is what is important and the PPP/C got the outcome they wanted, proving my point on the limitations of African majority presence in the coercive arms of the state.
I end this polemic with a similar contention like Ravi Dev, the African Ethnic Security Dilemma is alive and well. The current and prevailing narrative concerning the 2020 elections demonstrated that the AESD is still present.
Yours faithfully,
Tacuma Ogunseye
