Nuclear diplomacy

As the Trump era nears its end, a potential flashpoint in the Middle East has underscored the brinkmanship of its diplomacy. The assassination of the Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh – likely an Israeli operation with America’s support – has elevated regional tensions and nudged Iran closer to a direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia, its regional rival, and Israel, its sworn enemy. The Iranian president’s promised revenge for “the martyrdom of our scientist” is one of several indications that America’s sustained policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran could easily precipitate a war.

US policy towards Iran has been adversarial since the Trump administration withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. That complex multilateral deal, which included Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany was shepherded through by president Obama after nearly two years of negotiations. Obama hailed it as a measure that would prevent nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and prevent what seemed like an inevitable regional war. Trump’s withdrawal from the deal in 2018 and America’s subsequent sanctions on Tehran, have by contrast, led to Iran scrapping important restrictions on its domestic nuclear stockpile and warning that it would enrich uranium at levels that could be used for weapons. The Iranians also struck fear into the heart of the entire region in September 2019 when they used drones for a precision strike on Saudi Aramco’s oil processing facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais.

Following the assassination of Fakhrizadeh, Iran’s parliament has called for an end to UN inspections of its nuclear sites and withdrawal from an agreement that permits weapons inspectors from the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor Iran’s commitments to the deal. The JCPOA’s remaining signatories will meet in Vienna shortly to assess whether the agreement can be sustained and also the prospect of the US rejoining the coalition.

Not only will the Biden administration inherit these tensions, it will have less than a fortnight to address the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia. (The START deal guarantees oversight of more than 90 percent of the world’s entire nuclear arsenal.) It will also likely face a missile test by North Korea and provocations from the Taliban, newly emboldened by the withdrawal of US forces.

By themselves such crises would be a tall order for any incoming state department. Trump’s reluctance to begin a transition has complicated the situation further and risks leaving the US unready on several fronts. While grappling with the uncontrolled spread of a pandemic and a gathering economic crisis, Biden will also have to draw new lines in the sand with Iran, the Saudis and their Arab allies, and Israel.

Against expectations, Trump has realigned the politics of the Middle East, empowering the Saudis, sidelining the Palestinians, and boosting Israel in order to pressure Iran. Biden’s diplomats will have the unenviable task of negotiating this strange new landscape while trying to reassure an anxious region that a modified version of the 2015 status quo will be a sufficient restraint on Tehran. The future of several sanguinary proxy conflicts in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, will turn on their ability to do this, as will the far more chilling prospect of a wholesale regional war.