China and Taiwan

Oddly enough, Sir John soon chose to try to reverse his new government’s decision, but found it impossible to do so when a majority of the members of his cabinet refused to abide by his wishes. We shall probably never know the reasons for his attempted reversal, but it did seem to indicate a newfound certainty by him as to the changed significance of China in today’s world, as against what he might have thought of that country in 1996 when he left office.

We cannot even say that the twists and turns of the former St Lucia Prime Minister might have been ideologically grounded. For in the period since the end of the Cold War ideological orientation has not been a distinguishing feature of the Caricom governments which have chosen to recognise Taiwan. For example, few would have expected Dr Ralph Gonsalves to have continued the country’s recognition of Taiwan when his party came into office, and the same might be said about Dr Denzil Douglas’ St Kitts and Nevis Labour Party. But on the other hand, at the time many would have thought it unlikely that the Barbados Labour Party, generally deemed the more conservative of the two main parties in Barbados, would have been the one to reverse Errol Barrow’s insistence on retaining recognition of Taiwan.

An obligation that seems to be necessary for the parties recognising Taiwan, has been to show enthusiasm for facilitating Taiwan’s entry into the main international organisations, including the United Nations. They may have been buoyed in their efforts last year by a decision of the People’s Republic to allow Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organisation under the designation Chinese Taipei; and by the decision of the World Trade Organisation to accept Taiwan as a member under the designation “the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei),” a similar designation having been granted to both Hong Kong and Matsu.

Clearly, in the changing dynamics of global, and in particular Asia-Pacific economic relations, China has sought to be conciliatory to her own neighbours, and to the United States. There is also reason to believe that the Chinese leadership became sensitive to global opinion in the field of health with the onset of the threat of SARS. But undoubtedly also, the change in sentiment in Taiwan on the issue of pressing the case for recognition of Taiwanese sovereignty, following the assumption of government there by the Kuomintang party under President Ma, has induced Chinese to accommodate Taiwanese desires for a greater flexibility in its operations in the world at large.

Nonetheless, the Chinese have insisted that there are strict limits to any pretensions of sovereignty on Taiwan’s behalf, and insist that everyone, including the United States, strictly observe the ‘One China’ policy. So while in November last year, they themselves demonstrated even more flexibility in regard to Taiwan by signing a number of agreements, not simply on the opening up of so-called ‘cross-Straits travel,’ but also to a number of agreements on banking, insurance and securities with the government, they insisted that these agreements should be signed under the designations ‘the mainland side’ and ‘the Taiwan side.’ And as can be observed currently, the Chinese are raising a furore with the United States on the sale to Taiwan of military equipment like Patriot missiles and Black Hawk helicopters, which they consider weapons of aggression not required by an entity within its own formal jurisdiction. Once again, China has asserted its view that such an act “constitutes a gross intervention in China’s internal affairs, seriously endangers China’s national security and harms China’s peaceful reunification efforts.”

No doubt this rumbling will go on for some time. Political sentiment in the United States cannot be said to be particularly favourable to China at this time, and the Chinese protestations are unlikely to be used by anyone as a political weapon against President Obama. There is a perception in the US that the President has allowed himself to be humiliated by the Chinese leaders, both in the course of his recent trip to China, and then during the climate negotiations in Copenhagen. The publicly negative stance of the Chinese government on the issue of the exchange rate country’s currency and its effect on US-China trade also encourages a popular attitude that there is no need to genuflect to Chinese sensitivities. So the President’s coming meeting with the Dalai Lama is applauded.

The course of politics in Taiwan in the next few years will obviously influence the extent of the government’s current stance of relative conciliation towards China. Irrespective of the protestations of the last government and current opposition, that Taiwan’s sovereignty is being eroded, they too well know that the current efforts at rapprochement between China and Taiwan are directed towards the mutual enhancement of their economies at a time of changing global economic relations.

Here in the Caribbean, in recent times we have seen China willing to give assistance, including having a physical presence under the aegis of the United Nations in Haiti, in spite of the fact that the Government of Haiti has recognised Taiwan and has accepted a presence of that government there. This stance has continued after the earthquake, even as the Taiwanese Foreign Minister, on his way from Honduras, has stopped off in the Dominican Republic, which also recognises Taiwan, with generous and well-publicised offers of assistance. This no doubt all of Caricom would welcome.

But in international fora where the issue of a Taiwanese presence is likely to come up, Caricom will continue to show a split face – some against, as has been more often than not the case, some actively and vocally for.