The BBC was not alone in describing the hostage rescue carried out by the Colombian armed forces last Wednesday as like something out of a Hollywood movie script. Of course it will – sooner rather than later, one suspects – actually be transformed into a Hollywood movie script, with probably at best a tangential relationship to events as they occurred. But never mind, that is for the future. The euphoria which overtook people in many parts of the Americas on news of the hostages’ release, not to mention the mode of that release, was more than justified. Those left-wing leaders (or former leaders) in this hemisphere who had previously condemned President Álvaro Uribe of Colombia could not do otherwise than add their voices to the expressions of delight emanating from all quarters. For its part Venezuela declared its “jubilation” at the release, while in Granma the old former guerrilla, Mr Fidel Castro, wrote that from “a basic sentiment of humanity” he was “gladdened.”
What has now emerged from the Colombian and US press are some of the details of how a seeming ‘mission impossible’ was actually accomplished. Apart from the millions of dollars US Southern Command had poured into trying to locate and track the hostages, the plan was at least a year in the making. President Chávez’s intrusions into the hostage saga earlier this year, must therefore have been unwelcome in the circumstances. However, the Colombians turned even that to good account, by debriefing the six hostages who were released under the Venezuelan President’s auspices, and by copying the details of those processes, even down to the painting of the helicopters, in order to allay the guerrillas’ suspicions.
Apart from information supplied by the released hostages, Colombian intelligence was also able to retrieve useful observations from Jhon Frank Pinchao, who had escaped from FARC in April after nine years.
According to the New York Times he was an ex-policeman whose debriefing allowed agents to work out the general area where the hostages were being held. Some of the former hostages, said the daily, were able to give a profile of the commander named César, who had been in charge of them. From their descriptions Colombian intelligence was able to conclude that he was “psychologically fragile” after his companion had been captured earlier this year. The report went on to say that they sensed he was “particularly open” to praise from his superior officers. This insight turned out to be very useful when the ‘sting’ was being set up, as he was receptive to the notion that FARC’s top commander wanted him especially to organize the delivery of the hostages.
In addition to data retrieved from the computers of Raúl Reyes following the Colombian attack on his camp in Ecuador on March 1, sophisticated US equipment also played its role. The Associated Press was told that remote-controlled video-monitoring devices which could zoom in and out had been installed along the rivers – which as everyone in this country knows well are the highways of the forest – and “foliage-penetrating” imagery had been used. More to be expected, perhaps, was the interception of rebel radio and satellite phone conversations. It is this which in recent times had broken up FARC communication systems, and forced them to return to the “Middle Ages,” as Colombian army chief, General Fredy Padilla de Leon, put it. They now had to resort to the use of messengers carrying computer diskettes, etc, a method of communication which was inordinately slow. At least one informed observer was of the view that the entire operation was made possible because of the break-down in guerrilla communications.
As far as the actual rescue itself was concerned, some of the agents involved were given acting classes, and there were also rehearsals. The AP reported they were given lessons in imitating Italian, Arab, Caribbean Spanish and Australian English accents. This was in addition to the agent who mimicked the voice of Alfonso Cano, the top FARC commander, and pulled it off, as well as a mole at the FARC secretariat. The AP, in fact, referred to him as a “turncoat,” because he was said to have been a former guerrilla officer who had had a house and farm taken from him by his own commanding officer. His motivation, said the agency, was therefore “payback.”
Apart from these ‘actors’ in the drama, said NYT, there were, among others, four air force pilots in civilian clothes, four commandos who appeared to be aid workers, two who played the parts of guerrillas, and two who pretended to be a TV journalist and cameraman. The idea of the journalists had been inspired by the two exchanges negotiated by the Venezuelans, when President Chávez had sent his cameraman.
The guerrillas marched their captives through the jungle for miles to the rendezvous point, supposedly on instructions from Alfonso Cano, and brought together two groups who were being held separately on similar instructions. They believed their hostages were to be transported to Cano by an international NGO with left-wing sympathies for negotiations on a prisoner exchange, and they had no reason to suspect anything was wrong especially when they saw some of the personnel from the helicopter wearing Ché Guevara t-shirts.
It has been reported that the Colombian army personnel involved in this masquerade insisted that the hostages be handcuffed before they embarked on the helicopter. As one official explained later, some of the captives had been soldiers and policemen, and they didn’t want them trying to overpower the crew in a misplaced attempt to rescue themselves. All major media sources reported that once on the helicopter, César and another guerrilla who were accompanying the hostages were asked to hand over their weapons, because the international NGO which would be waiting with Cano would not like to see them armed. They complied, and were immediately overpowered. The Miami Herald quoted General Padilla as saying that from the time the helicopter landed to the freeing of the hostages, the operation lasted exactly 22 minutes and 13 seconds.
And there was a Plan B. The Herald reported that more troops were available on Wednesday to surround the hostages and guerrillas in case the original plan backfired. The idea, it was said, was to create a “humanitarian cordon, which would put pressure on [the guerrillas], tell them that they are surrounded, and convince them to release the hostages.” As it was, given a perfectly executed, bloodless operation, this turned out not to be necessary.
While the US afforded a great deal of high-tech assistance in terms of locating the hostages, the actual operation does not seem to have relied on any sophisticated technology, rather on old-fashioned – albeit sophisticated in conception – security work. What there was, was professionalism, careful planning, intelligence, training, rehearsals, preparation at all levels, the placing of at least one mole a year ago, and careful attention to every detail. And this from a military, which as the NYT said, “only a few years ago could rarely be trusted.”
Will our politicians and senior security operatives learn anything from the conduct of this astonishing operation? If past experience is anything to go by, unfortunately, probably not.
