Libya’s prisoner and the Nato allies

The British political system has been thrown into turmoil by the decision of the Scottish Minister of Justice to release the Libyan Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi,  convicted of the bombing of the Pan Am aircraft in 1999 with 270 persons on board, over Lockerbie, Scotland. No one doubts that the responsibility for a decision to grant an amnesty on compassionate grounds fell within the jurisdiction of the Scottish authorities. For in spite of the fact that Britain is a unitary state, Scotland has a legal system that is constitutionally distinct, with a high level of autonomy from the rest of the British legal system.

The decision has also raised the hackles of the United States authorities, given that there were a large number of United States citizens on the Pan Am aircraft. It has prompted a strong statement  of condemnation from President Barack Obama himself, and criticisms by various American authorities not only of the Scottish authorities’ decision, of what the Americans believe to be a deliberate lack of intervention by the British government in a matter which could obviously have serious international  implications, or at least implications for the NATO allies. The British, and in particular Prime Minister Brown himself, have insisted in the midst of American criticism as well as criticism from British opposition parties, that the United Kingdom government had no right of intervention in the making of the decision, and could not legitimately bring what would be extraneous, in the sense of non-legal, issues to bear on the matter.

The British government well recognizes, however, that the decision will have at least short-term negative implications for the cohesion of British-US relations. As is often the case in matters relating to terrorism, the moral ire of the Americans has reached a high point, and they insist that the British should have considered the external and moral considerations pertinent to the release. One of these, from a US point of view, was the inability of the Scottish authorities to make proper judgements on the process and outcomes of negotiations with the Libyan authorities, in particular the Libyan leader President Gaddafi. This prompts the Americans to say that, in effect, the British government should easily have recognized that the issue had serious implications for the external relations policies of the United Kingdom , the United States and indeed the NATO allies, and that as such, the Scottish government, in practical terms, exceeded its competence.

The American position has been reinforced by the admission by the Scottish authorities that they had sought to have President Gaddafi  treat the matter as completely humanitarian, and not a diplomatic issue linked in any way to the previous controversies as to who was liable for the Pan Am bombing. The President seems to have been following this course for some years, in the process of concluding the arrangements for the extradition of al-Megrahi  to Scotland to be tried under Scottish jurisdiction, and then in discussions with the Scottish government on the terms on which the convicted prisoner would be released  solely on “compassionate and mercy” grounds. But with the arrival of al-Megrahi in Tripoli, Gaddafi turned his return into a major national celebration,  internationally displayed, the implication obviously being that the convicted prisoner had done nothing wrong.

The United States, feeling deeply bruised by the turn taken by Libya, has insisted that the British authorities should have anticipated the possibility of such a reaction, and in doing so, should have taken a decision to let the prisoner spend the three months of what is anticipated to be left of his life given his cancer, die under British jurisdiction. In that context, the Americans have been prone to suggest that the United Kingdom has let its material interests, in particular the big oil deals settled by British companies in Libya after the unfreezing of relations between that country and the NATO allies, take precedence over strict legal concerns. And they claim that the British have, in effect, sacrificed moral and humanitarian concerns, particularly those held by the relatives of the victims of the bombing, to its economic concerns. This charge naturally, the British vehemently deny, even while acknowledging that various British officials, including the Minister for Business Lord Mandelson, had been visiting and consulting with the Libyan authorities in recent times.

In that context, as the Americans insist on the moral question, the British are prone to accuse them of hypocrisy, given the Americans’ own proclivity in recent years, to engage with the Libyans in terms of American investment, with the autocratic Saudis and with the current quasi-military Egyptian regime.  The controversy indeed raises a long standing argument which has the British asserting that they understand the predominance of ‘realism’ and realpolitik in international relations, while the Americans are prone to periodically go on flights of fancy in insisting on a proper balance between  ‘ideals’ and ‘self-interest.’ The British are, of course, reacting on the basis of, to take one recent example, American policy positions on the issue of the ‘rendition’ of persons they accuse of being terrorists, and the understanding and willingness of America’s NATO allies to cooperate in moving the said terrorists from place to place for interrogation. And no doubt, reference will be made to the treatment of prisoners held in the war on terror in Guantanamo in Cuba.

As Philip Stephens writing in the Financial Times on August 24 put it:  “The US …should be careful in shouting too loudly about affronts to the rule of law. Its own recent contributions to faith in international justice have hardly been exemplary. Nor, over the decades, has Washington been deaf to arguments that reconciliation sometimes demands painful moral compromises. US eagerness to see the release of former terrorists in Northern Ireland springs to mind.”

On the other hand, there can be little doubt that Gordon Brown and his government, already reeling from one controversy and policy mishap to another in the last year or so, is being further politically bruised by the incident. The government has seemed unconvincing as it has sought to maintain the distinction between British government responsibilities and Scottish government jurisdiction. The Labour government has come under strong criticism from both the Conservatives and Liberals, even though the scent of opportunism is obviously strong in their case, and Brown has been unconvincing in responding to claims that Lord Mandelson and others may have discussed this matter with President Gaddafi on their recent visits.

The inference for the British and Scottish authorities would in that environment seem to be, that the UK has been fooled by Gaddafi who has scored, from Libya’s perspective, a diplomatic coup, and that correspondingly, Britain’s international reputation has been damaged.