The Cuban paradox

Cuba was on practically everyone’s lips in hemispheric political and diplomatic circles before and during the Fifth Summit of the Americas. And the future status of the communist island nation in inter-American affairs is still a hot topic.

Before the summit, Latin American and Caribbean leaders had contributed to rising temperature levels by issuing calls, ranging from demanding that Cuba be present to the desirability of incorporating discussion on the lifting of the US embargo and the reintegration of Cuba into the Organization of American States (OAS).

Then just one month before the Summit, Costa Rica and El Salvador announced that they would re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, leaving the United States isolated as the only country in the hemisphere not to enjoy friendly relations with Cuba. This alone could be regarded as a major triumph of Cuba’s long-term diplomatic strategy.

It all seemed almost choreographed.

No doubt feeling some pressure, President Barack Obama felt compelled, a few days before the summit, to announce the lifting of restrictions on travel by Cuban-Americans and on remittance flows to Cuba, thereby honouring one of his campaign promises and demonstrating that he was not deaf to the noise coming from Latin America and the Caribbean. He also announced that he would lift curbs on US telecommunications companies to provide services to their Cuban counterparts.

At the summit, Mr Obama declared in his opening statement that “the United States seeks a new beginning with Cuba” and that his administration was ready to “engage with the Cuban government on a wide range of issues – from human rights, free speech, and democratic reform to drugs, migration, and economic issues.”

Cuba, it appears, surfaced again as one of the main bones of contention in the retreat of leaders, and it has been speculated that this may even have contributed to the refusal of some Presidents to sign the Declaration of Port of Spain.

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Patrick Manning’s official closing statement contains a paragraph dedicated to Cuba, which reveals that “several Presidents and Prime Ministers called for an end to the exclusion of the Cuba from the Summit process and the inter-American system” and that there was “a clear consensus” that the reintegration of Cuba was “an essential step toward the building of a more cohesive and integrated Americas.” To add balance, Mr Manning also praised President Obama’s “very open and conciliatory stance.”

Mr Obama, in saying at his press conference at the end of the summit that he would “explore” possible new steps in relation to Cuba, also asked Havana to free political prisoners, suppress a 20 per cent tax on remittances and allow Cubans to travel abroad freely. It would seem that he believes in an incremental process of dialogue, engagement and reciprocity, given his own actions and statements, and in light of President Raúl Castro’s affirmation before the summit that “everything,” including political prisoners and human rights, was on the table. In this respect, everything would seem to be negotiable.

Since the summit, however, Fidel Castro appears to have spurned Mr Obama’s outstretched hand, writing in his newspaper column on April 22 that Mr Obama “misinterpreted Raúl’s statement” and that the tax would not be removed and that indeed, there were no political prisoners in Cuba. In other words, there will be no concessions on the Cuban side.

Jorge Castañeda, the former Foreign Minister of Mexico, writing in Newsweek, says that “Raúl is only sort of in charge” and that “as long as Fidel is alive and in charge, there will either be unilateral action, apologies and repentance by the United States, or an eternal perpetuation of the status quo with Cuba.” This is an extremely pessimistic, if not mischievous view, but Dr Castañeda is known to be no great fan of the Castros.

It may well be that the Cubans are simply digging in for a long, hard-fought negotiation, even as Fidel asserts that certain issues are non-negotiable. As Daniel Erikson, a Cuba expert at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, puts it: “The Cuban leadership is fundamentally ambivalent about engaging with the United States, so they’re not prepared to make concessions to support greater normalisation.”

The Cuban paradox is that, as much as Cuba needs new investment flows and new markets for its exports, which would provide much needed foreign currency to underwrite the benefits provided by the state and the continued survival of the revolution, it is by no means clear that the Cuban leadership would be able to maintain a Chinese or Vietnamese model of state control over what could evolve into an essentially hybrid capitalist system, in the face of a massive inflow of US dollars, free market ideas, and notions of democracy, free speech and human rights.

Thus, the Cuban leadership may well be buying time to tighten their control over a system threatened by change from within and without.

But undeterred by the rumblings emanating from Havana, the Obama administration is reportedly testing the waters through informal channels of communication with Cuba on how best to engage. Of course, no one really expects the US-Cuba relationship to change overnight. It has perforce to be a two-way, incremental process of respectful dialogue, engagement and compromise to succeed. It will obviously take time.