Politics, in particular presidential politics, in our Brazilian neighbour continues to take an interesting turn as economic growth has substantially diminished since the period of President Lula da Silva’s tenure. During the second decade of this century the country, with the eighth largest economy in the world and a leading member of the so-called emerging economies or BRICS, has experienced a dramatic slowdown, registering economic growth at 2.7% in 2011 and now 2.2%. Other BRICS like India, Russia and China have tended to average between 4 and 9%.
In the presidential elections of 2010 President Dilma Rousseff, a close associate of the then President Lula da Silva, achieved 56% of the national vote. Having had, however, to undergo a run-off in the 2014 elections she was only able to obtain 51% against 48% for her opponent, who joined the race only after the death of the intended candidate.
To most observers, the closeness of the election suggests a major weakening of Rousseff, attributed to a substantial decline in the country’s economic growth which she has not been able to staunch. In addition, the period before and during the election campaign has been plagued with allegations of corruption against the regimes led both by herself and President Lula, which Rousseff has seemed unable to throw off. And this, combined with the slowdown of the economy, put the President in a situation of having to be running a campaign directed at continually fighting off accusations, instead of putting her plans for a restoration of the economy at the forefront.
Clearly, the continuing accusations against the President’s last period of governance, which were extended backwards into the regime of Lula, created a substantial difficulty for her campaign and that discomfort has clearly continued into the new term. But there can also be little doubt that the decline of the economy has affected the country’s status as one of the BRICS committed to establishing a substantial collective presence in international diplomacy. And there does seem some indication that the President is now more committed to managing her domestic arrangements than in further promoting the establishment of the international diplomatic presence that Lula had initiated .
Clearly, her ability to focus on domestic affairs is being affected by uncertainty about the outcome of the extensive corruption allegations. The fact that the President was, up to 2010, chairperson of Petrobras, the country’s major oil company, which has been formally investigated and found to be the source of substantial corruption including money laundering and bribery, has placed her as the centre-piece of public protest, almost deflecting, to her, accusations deriving from the period when Lula was president.
The fact of the matter is that opposition parties and groups have chosen to focus on her, as against Lula who maintains a substantial popularity in the country. The narrowness of her majority in the last elections, when combined with the weakness of the economy, is inducing the opposition in that direction at a time when, it would appear, the President and her government’s behaviour have no alternative strategy for survival, except being adamant in not acknowledging the extent of popular dissatisfaction.
Against that background, the external image of the country would appear to be likely to be diminished. Some commentators have, for some time, been also asserting that the status quo is untenable, even if there are no charges made against the President herself, except to demand that she give some statement of accountability in respect of the allegations now being made, particularly when she held the position of Chairperson of Petrobras.
In the face of her situation, comment is beginning to be made as to whether Brazil can much longer be characterized as one of the BRICS, able to carry the kinds of diplomatic positions that have given the country a certain degree of prominence in international affairs. And indeed, commentators who have hesitated to accord to the BRICS a sufficient degree of cohesiveness to sustain positions with a determination that can influence the major powers, seem now inclined to suggest that Brazil, as at present, can hardly, in spite of the traditional strength of its diplomatic structure, sustain that posture.
There is, from a position of being outside the country, some difficulty in assessing how long the protest against the Rousseff government can continue. And from our perspective, of course, it is necessary to recognize the institutional stability of the foreign relations structure of the country that permits a certain continuity in the implementation of agreements made.
Yet, there can be little doubt that a situation of continuing protest and instability in a country even as large as Brazil and with its settled structures of decision-making, cannot, given the postures in international diplomacy that it has asserted over the last decade and more, afford to maintain its present situation, which must imply a degree of stagnation in its decision making vis-à-vis Latin America, and its wider relations with major developing countries.
