What, to many governments in the hemisphere, and particularly the government of the United States of America as President Obama prepares to leave office, must surely be a severe disappointment, has been the referendum last week in Colombia which rejected the agreement negotiated by the government of President Juan Manuel Santos with the guerrilla grouping referring to itself as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
The agreement, the result of four years of negotiation, was intended to end what had indeed become a civil war lasting, so far, over fifty years, and what had been a major concern of the US, particularly from the American perspective that the sustenance of the FARC was apparently deeply based on involvement in the drug trade. And it was given an aura of international recognition to the extent that the over 7000 militants of the group were to surrender their weapons under the supervision of arrangements made by the United Nations.
The narrow majority gained by the opposition of 50.2% versus 49.8%, has been the result of a decision taken by former President of Colombia Alvaro Uribe under whose government President Santos had previously served as Defence Minister, to oppose the agreement on the grounds that it was insufficiently comprehensive. But there seems also to have been a personal consideration on the part of Uribe, whose father had been assassinated by the FARC, and in whose judgement, the relatively liberal terms of the agreement did not measure up to the extent of the damage done to a Colombia in which 220,000 citizens had been killed.
The narrowness of the majority has obviously indicated the intensity of the debate which has taken place, particularly, it seems, over the agreement that the FARC membership of 7000 should be granted a general amnesty at best, and at least should be subject to what has been referred to as a “transitional justice programme” which would also involve restricted sentences of those currently under the jurisdiction of the government.
Undoubtedly, the government of Cuba, which has played a substantial hand in the proceedings leading to the agreement will be severely disappointed at the result of the referendum. And indeed, the Cuban leadership, having taken an independent decision to play the role of mediator in the negotiating process, seemed to have had the implicit support of the American government.
Yet, there will have been those in Colombia who will have taken the view that the Cuban government had undoubtedly given implicit support to the FARC over the years, and should not expect that citizens of Colombia would be explicitly supportive of the agreement, implying that the agreement reached was an excessively liberal one, in terms of acts committed over the years by FARC members.
It is left to be seen whether there will be initiatives from the US, through the wider hemispheric framework, in terms of seeking to influence the opposition in Colombia to take steps towards continuing the attempt at ending what has, in effect, been a virtual civil war in the country. Relationships between the US and the government of Cuba will, most likely, be part of such efforts, in addition to initiatives from other Latin American governments.
In that context, the hostility of the opponents of the agreement reflects doubt as to whether the FARC will undertake the terms of any agreement. The FARC has indicated that “it reiterates our disposition to use only words as a weapon to build the future”, but to the opponents of the agreement, the methodology for ensuring the liquidation of the weaponry maintained by the group was not satisfactory.
What, in that situation would appear to be necessary, is clear indications from those who support the agreement, specifically the United States and Cuba, to seek to ensure that the initial steps required to be taken by the FARC will indeed be pursued. In that context the Cubans will be urging that they have fulfilled such commitments that have now permitted the FARC to agree to transform itself into a conventional political party, but that this process cannot be completed if the necessary guarantees required of the government are not fulfilled.
President Santos is now midway into his term of government. The hostility to him from former president Uribe has been, and continues to be, intense. As President Obama’s term draws to an end, it is unlikely that the US can make the kinds of commitments to the forces opposing the agreement in Colombia that they will feel to be acceptable. And in any case, the President will be reluctant to leave office being accused of interference in the domestic relations of Colombia.
On a wider plane it is obvious that the Government of Cuba, as it pursues its path of normalization with the US, can do little at this point to extract any further concessions from a FARC which has already agreed to virtually dissolve itself in terms of its armed capability. Current events in Colombia, too, indicate that the hostility to the agreement reflects an increasingly bitter political contention between the Uribe forces and the present government in matters increasingly unrelated to the present issue. The opposition is taking advantage of a stage of relative inability to exert pressure on the part of the US, as the regime there is on the eve of change.
In that intense political context, it would appear that other Latin American governments relevant to the situation, for example Brazil, will hardly wish to be pursuing initiatives relative to which they can easily be accused, by Colombian opposing forces, of intervention.
