It may seem to Guyanese that oil issues are coming to a head, that is, to some conclusion.
They are not. We have to be prepared for a long and tough slog on our journey to get a fair deal for the working people of Guyana, and to finally start transforming the governance apparatus of our country.
For us to benefit from our own oil wealth, or from any of our wealth, be it gold, bauxite, etc, we need to reduce the 50-year ongoing theft by parasitic elites (both political and private sector), who sometimes have been in cahoots with international sharks. We need to finally start dismantling this tragic system created by Burnham’s PNC and perfected by Jagdeo’s PPP.
Although it is election season, and many are trying hard not to use their mental abilities for critical reasoning and independent judgement, I am sure most people secretly see through the fragile veneer, the house of cards, and the king with no clothes phenomena.
Below I will highlight main elements of the philosophy and strategy I executed in my work to help Guyana get a fair deal from its oil.
Firstly, on my perspective. I come from the oil industry and from Guyana, and also from Denmark and the US, and lived and worked in Asia and Africa. So I have a wide perspective and I am not anti-oil, and I hope to return to a full-time job in the oil industry shortly, or to any decent job in any industry, after winding down my pro-bono advocacy work for Guyana. It is unlikely ExxonMobil or Hess will employ me to assist with their projects in Guyana.
Guyana is an experiment to prove that oil and gas can be developed in a weak country in a manner which is equitable and sustainable. Non-renewable and polluting resources like oil should only be developed if the people of the country see most of the long-term benefit. We are starting from scratch in Guyana, and we have much evidence from other countries which failed, so there is no reason we should not succeed in Guyana.
But the forces against us are daunting.
Although the oil companies are our partners, or more correctly our contractors, they are not our family nor friends. Just like in any other business venture. The relationship should be business-like and professional; and they should not be treated as great saviours as is the case now. They should not be assisting government to do government’s work, like a national development plan. They should not be encouraged to do large Corporate Social Responsibility projects because our own government is incapable of providing services to the people. No, the oil companies need to make a reasonable profit for their large investment and technical expertise, but that is where it stops.
Guyana will not fail because of predatory behaviours by ExxonMobil or Hess. These companies are not pulling a fast one on us, since what they do is clear, and they do it over and over again in countries like Guyana. Their processes are well known, such as bulking up costs, bullying and influencing politicians and decision makers to accept silly contracts, and using small companies as proxies to do their dirty work, etc. They always take the path of least resistance.
No, the reason Guyana is likely to fail is because of us, and more specifically because we do not hold our representatives accountable for their actions when they collude with companies to defraud the country. We are in the current mess, a mess bigger than US$55 billion, because of some of our own politicians; in government, and in the main opposition.
An oil company can easily spend a couple US$100 million on influencing and buying off Guyanese elites, so as to take US$55 billion extra from us. Guyana is a push-over for these big companies. We are an ideal target with our internal divisions, stoked and fed continually by illegitimate and corrupt politicians. These politicians are being supported by their friends in the private sector, who get the construction contracts. And these politicians use race as a tool so they can continue to feed off the working people and the country’s resources. They are literally feeding off of human and natural resources. Where have we come in 50 years?
We are an ideal target for exploitative contracts because we do not respect ourselves, our youth, our environment, or our beautiful nature.
When Raleigh came looking for “el dorado” he thought he did not find it, but it was an enigma, a puzzle. He could not see it although he stood right there in it. Many of our indigenous brothers and sisters know this. And it is similar with our oil in the ground, it is not a panacea, and it is not a cure-all balm.
I believe Guyana will not succeed with oil if Guyana thinks it desperately needs the oil. We will not succeed with oil if we blame our slow progress over the last 50 years on the absence of oil. And no, we will not succeed over the next 50 years if we believe oil is the main ingredient for future success.
If we can grasp this, then we can succeed with oil. That is with caution, with a focus on fixing our existing problems first, with building our capacity, with reasonable rates of oil production, with consideration of rising sea-level, flooding and global warming, etc.
We need to stop being hypocritical with our green aspirations and oil. We will need to constrain oil production to a reasonable level, a couple big projects are enough, or else we would be doing a complete U-turn with respect to the environment and the planet.
Drug addiction is a disease and I make no moral judgement with the following analogy:
“We cannot succeed with oil if we behave like drugs addicts, getting a brief high on the crumbs being thrown to us, and ignoring the sustenance which has always been around us.”
So what did I do.
I was lucky and honoured that President Granger and the IDB hired me to advise on oil, and initially I focused on a top down approach, to push best practices from the top.
Although we had numerous successes, like publishing the contracts, recycling the Petroleum Commission Bill, stopping white elephant projects, and removing responsibility for oil and gas from a Ministry that did nothing positive with it, it was clear the top down approach had constraints. It is my view President Granger, the IDB and I were aligned on pretty much all the issues, even on getting a better deal for Guyana, but I suspect the President was constrained by the fragile parliamentary majority and by the large coalition.
I also warned the President it was likely some elements in the previous government were influenced by the oil companies since they awarded the Canje and Kaieteur Blocks to non-entities, in highly suspicious circumstances days before the last elections. ExxonMobil and Hess then quickly bought big shares in those two blocks.
So a bottom up approach was also needed—in addition to the top down approach—the objective of which was to raise the awareness of oil issues with the people, with civil society groups, youth groups, private sector groups, indigenous groups, etc.
The local and international press had to become aware of the issues in Guyana. I collaborated with many journalists, both local and foreign, and still do. I fear that if oil corruption gets out of hand in Guyana, we will see journalists victimised. Like I saw journalists being harmed in the Philippines on a regular basis, and we see all the time in failed oil states. Journalists are the canaries, and special investigative journalism was needed to reduce the chance of Guyana heading too far off in the wrong direction.
ExxonMobil and their local friends tried to keep Guyana quiet; that was part of their strategy. Hide Guyana from the preying and critical eyes of its own people and others around the world.
I believed we had to bring in the international NGOs who had proven track records of helping countries like Guyana, especially in natural resources and anti-corruption, like Global Witness.
I assumed other types of organisations, like Chatham House, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the World Bank, would be pushing best practices and would be champions for equitable and sustainable development. But I was wrong. It became clear the major countries like the US, UK and Canada only paid lip-service to Guyana’s interests when their own companies were affected, as these countries should have been more forceful in helping steer Guyana towards success.
I likely will be biased towards the IDB as I worked for them. They continually tried to push Guyana in the right direction, sometimes without having the folks in DC as their cheerleaders. The IDB experienced many years under the previous government in Guyana, so they did not have much tolerance for similar behaviours from some members in the current government.
I suspected ExxonMobil and Hess were being too optimistic in the information they provided to their investors and Wall Street, in that some risks associated with Guyana may have been underplayed. Companies do this all the time as they have a bias towards providing rosy outlooks. So I focused a bit on this area.
There is a lot more to write. But we must not feel helpless, although the odds seem stacked against us. We need to recognise the progress we have made. Some of our local journalists have been unrelenting in their pursuit for knowledge of the oil industry, and also have been brave in challenging authority. Some civil society groups are organising and asking the right questions. Some new political parties have taken a pro-Guyana stand on the oil contracts.
And might it be possible President Granger would not approve the third project, Payara, unless Guyana gets a re-balanced contract? This would be momentous. And might the opposition change their position and start calling for a re-negotiation of the Stabroek Block contract, and for the Canje and Kaieteur awards to be rescinded? And might Guyanese finally create a new and more accountable system of governance?
If I, as the President’s adviser at the time in February 2018, with my oil experience, could not stand-up in front of students at UG and be honest about the ExxonMobil oil contract, how could I expect others to start asking questions about oil? It was a given that many powerful people and companies would be annoyed.
