Dear Editor,
In probing why they lost the government, the coalition parties, separately and collectively, must not remain locked down in the cheated-not-defeated mindset. Or they would miss several insights that would inform them on the best way forward whatever are the true election results.
In the 2015 election, the Guyanese electorate, by ousting the PPP, expressed a desire for national political rebirth. To respond to this mood, the coalition needed to prioritize two strategies: one was not to be publicly perceived as a twin of the PPP (a separate discussion). The other was for the AFC to exhibit its autonomy often enough to be perceived as being brave and responsive to ethnic (Indo-Guyanese), occupational (agricultural) and geographic concerns. So mission-critical were these two strategies that they should have received perpetual management.
The AFC had to find answers to a key challenge, one at the heart of coalition politics everywhere: the oneness vs distinctiveness dilemma. This dilemma challenges each party in a coalition to walk the tight rope between preserving group unity whilst, at the same time, exerting its own individuality. On this test, the AFC failed badly. Its public posture mostly conveyed acquiescence or submissiveness. Even on controversial matters (take, for instance, the closure of sugar estates or the lease revocation for the Cheddi Jagan Research Centre), we saw no expression of its own identity. Its silence undercut both its own political viability and the electoral attractiveness of the coalition.
Paradoxically, the AFC demonstrated during the two Cummingsburg Accord negotiations that it could be openly contentious and self-assertive within the coalition. But outside of those events that discussed the sharing of the pie, it seemed to value groupthink over expressing differing or distinctive views.
Of note, distinctiveness need not be expressed only through public displays of disagreement among coalition partners. Another way is for individual parties to publicly champion special initiatives. The WPA cash transfer proposal was a case in point. Key segments of the electorate, however, did not see the AFC on the forefront of issues that spoke to its own self-identity, that spoke to constituency concerns, such as racial equality and the welfare of displaced sugar workers.
It is tempting to assume that oneness or unity in a coalition is always a virtue as it guarantees its stability and longevity. In excess, it is actually a political liability. To understand why, one need only consider that the strength of most coalitions depends on their ability to attract a broad and diverse public. Sustaining party distinctiveness, whether genuine or choreographed, promotes that attractiveness. Conversely, the more the identities of coalition partners merge, the smaller the sum of the parts.
Given what we know of the AFC’s support base from the 2011 and 2015 elections, and given the presence of the PNCR as the dominant partner in the coalition, the AFC’s apparent non-effort to keep its distinctiveness is hard to explain. Political miscalculation or ineptitude? Agenda overload? Fear of being accused of fostering disunity? If fostering disunity was the concern, then several dispute resolution mechanisms could have been set up to minimize the risk of a break up. (see discussion in, for example, letter to the editor “Coalition politics requires good decision-making structures, processes” https://www.stabroeknews.com/2017/11/28/opinion/letters/coalition-politics-requires-good-decision-making-structures-processes/)
Should the coalition partners assess the reasons why they lost the government, they should not succumb to self-denial and overlook a wider analysis. Retaking the government first requires confronting all truths.
Yours faithfully,
Sherwood Lowe
