Constituency politics in Guyana is flopping

Dear Editor,

Two of our respected advocates of constitution reform are once again calling for the adoption of one of the more appealing and less disputed ideas in our political restructuring—that of closing the distance between elected representatives and those who elect them.  Desmond Thomas (Letter in SN 14th November) thus asserts that the government’s proposed changes to the election laws miss “the opportunity to make real progress by increasing the number of constituencies and improving the accountability connection between representatives and citizens”. Ralph Ramkarran, in his latest post on his Conversation Tree blog, mourns that the 2001 reforms of the electoral system did not continue to the point to have, in his phrasing, the desired effect where an MP is identified with a particular constituency and constituency offices are established for the public to meet their MPs to address their issues and grievances.

Unfortunately, both gentlemen have entirely ignored the fact that since 2016, the country has had actual case studies to empirically (not theoretically) see for itself how the constituency politics they advocate has actually performed. I refer, of course, to the return of local government elections in 2016 and its recurrence in 2018, both based on wide-ranging reforms to bridge the representation gap (or, to use Thomas’ words, to improve the accountability connection) between the elected and electors. These elections were held in over 70 Local Authority Areas using a mixed electoral system to achieve two levels of connection: an upper level to elect half of the councilors using proportional representation and a gap-closing first-past-the-post constituency level to elect the other half.  The system is open to voluntary groups, political parties and individual candidates to contest for seats in the municipalities and NDCs. A candidate must be living in the constituency being contested (my representative lives in the street just behind mine). Up to 18 councilors sit on NDCs and up to 30 in municipalities. In short, an elaborate setup to achieve the grand objectives of a serious local government democratic or a constituency political system.

But, alas, the system is severely flopping by most measures—measures that need no elaboration as many of us experience or can observe the failures in our own communities firsthand. But let’s list some of them: nonexistent accountability to constituents; lack of transparency and public consultations in making major decisions (such as land sales); under-financing; inconsistent services; continued linkage to the national political dynamic; growth of oligarchies; and widespread disinterest and disenchantment of residents.

Given all these disappointments (and not only with local government but with most of the 2001 constitutional reforms), I would ask Messrs Ramkarran and Thomas (and all others who call for extensive constitution re-engineering) to pick up my recommendation in a 2019 letter that before we seek additional changes, let us thoroughly review why many of the wonderful ideas from the last Constitution Reform Commission (CRC)  process have failed to deliver on hopes and expectations. In that letter, I proposed that a review (or impact assessment) should answer the following critical questions: (i) have the good governance measures healed racial insecurity and political disharmony (the two challenges that birthed the CRC process)? (ii) to what extent have all the 1999/2000 proposals been implemented? For instance, how has Article 13 (establishment of an inclusionary democracy) moved beyond words? And (iii) to what extent have implemented measures fulfilled their design objectives? For instance, how effective have been the Ethnic Relations Commission and the local government system?

Yours faithfully,

Sherwood Lowe