By Dr Bertrand Ramcharan
Seventh Chancellor of the University of Guyana Previously UN
Under-Secretary-General
Guyana has achieved a notable gain in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which unanimously held on 1 December that “pending a final decision in the case, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela shall refrain from taking any action which would modify the situation that currently prevails in the territory in dispute, whereby the Cooperative Republic of Guyana administers and exercises control over that area.” The Court also unanimously ordered that “Both Parties shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve.”
With Venezuela choosing not to participate in the case before the Court, Guyana could be expected to win its case that the 1899 Arbitral Award and subsequent boundary demarcation are both valid and binding. Guyana’s government has ostensibly chosen the route of sticking to the ICJ, and that has been made apparent in the public statements being made in Guyana and abroad. In reply to Venezuelan bellicosity, Guyana has been responding in kind, and indulging in some name-calling about the Venezuelan administration.
Venezuela has stuck to its guns in going ahead with the holding of the referendum and has publicly declared that it will not be deterred by the order of the ICJ. How far Venezuela will go in implementing the results of the referendum remains to be seen.
This is a situation with risks for Guyana, for Venezuela, for CARICOM, and for the world. Guyana has the law on its side, but it is dealing with a far larger country in size and population, and with much larger armed forces. At the end of the day, let it be clear: if it comes to it, Guyanese armed forces will be on their own in a face-off with Venezuela.
For Venezuela, it is now branding itself as an outlaw country in direct confrontation with the International Court of Justice and international legality. With more aggressive actions it will stain itself even more as an outlaw country.
For CARICOM, it has a declared interest in maintaining the Caribbean as a zone of peace. It has an interest in demonstrating solidarity with Guyana, a founding member. It also has an interest in maintaining friendly relations with Venezuela, a long-standing friend, keeping in mind that countries such as Trinidad and Tobago have territorial issues to be worked out with Venezuela.
For the United Nations and the world, it would be highly unfortunate to have another country invade the territory of a peaceful neighbour and take over two thirds of it. It would be a frontal assault on the international rule of law.
One of the things that one learned in a career of peacemaking and peacekeeping at the United Nations is that, when dealing with parties in conflict, one should always be attentive of the need to identify a ladder or ladders, for them to climb down. This was a foundational lesson imparted by the great Sir Brian Urquhart, a mentor.
Which brings us to the current situation between Guyana and Venezuela. Might one be able to identify a ladder for one or both of the parties to use?
That ladder could be CARICOM facilitation of a solution between the parties. Please note that we use the term ‘facilitation’ which means, in this context, helping the parties exchange views about ways forward to an amicable solution. We are not suggesting mediation, a process in which the mediator can suggest solutions. In a process of facilitation, the facilitator listens to the parties, engages in discussions with them, and tries to identify ideas from the discussion that the parties might be able to agree upon.
Venezuela wants a return to talks under the Geneva agreement, while Guyana has ruled this out, maintaining, accurately, that the Geneva process has legitimately led to the ICJ. CARICOM facilitation would be independent of the Geneva accord process.
Guyana wants affirmation of the 1899 Arbitral Award and the resultant demarcation of the boundary. Venezuela ostensibly claims two-thirds of Guyana but it has been reported for some time that what it really wants is a maritime corridor to the Atlantic. CARICOM facilitation could help ascertain what Venezuela really wants, and whether Guyana might be ready to negotiate on this.
If CARICOM facilitation were to discover that Venezuela is insisting on two-thirds of Guyana then the process must end immediately and CARICOM must give unqualified support and solidarity to Guyana in its case before the ICJ. If CARICOM facilitation clarifies that Venezuela wants, for example, a maritime corridor giving its vessels right of passage, then this option could be brought into the open and the Guyanese people consulted on whether they would be willing to consider such a maritime corridor, it being clearly understood that what is involved is grant of passage, while the sea, subsoil and resources belong to Guyana.
An apparently well-informed comment in the column “Peeping Tom”, on 10 November, stated: “There are many Guyanese who are of the mistaken view that a favourable ICJ ruling will bring an end to the controversy over the granting of oil concessions by Guyana in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). But these persons need to be reminded that while Guyana’s land boundaries have been demarcated, the same has not been done for Guyana’s maritime boundaries with Venezuela and a separate round of legal proceedings will have to be done under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”.
The same columnist, who appears to have experience in the Guyanese Foreign Ministry, added: “As per the issue of a sea lane to the Atlantic, this was an issue that was broached since the time of Forbes Burnham. It was not a Jagdeo invention. The Venezuelans contend that during Burnham’s presidency, and during informal contacts, a concrete proposal in the maritime area was made by Guyana. In its memorandum to the ICJ, Venezuela noted that during the Good Officers process, on the 29th October 1990 (under the Desmond Hoyte presidency), a member of the Guyana’s side was reported to have said that the greatest contribution Guyana could make to overcome the dispute was in the maritime area and that this could involve ‘a corridor towards the Atlantic, possibly accompanied by a small stretch of coastline.’ There are a great many things which were discussed during that Good Officers Process that would cause heads to turn now in Guyana. But that is better left for another day.”
The idea of a maritime corridor is, in fact, a Venezuelan idea. The late Dr Cheddi Jagan, visiting this author in the late 1970s, told him that Venezuela had put this idea to him. There have been other published reports that what Venezuela has sought in the past negotiations was a maritime corridor through Guyana’s waters giving it access to the Atlantic.
Returning to a possible CARICOM role, during the period of CARICOM facilitation Guyana would maintain its application before the ICJ, so it would lose nothing in participating in a process of CARICOM facilitation.
It would be clearly understood that during the period of CARICOM facilitation Venezuela would not implement any of the measures provided for in the referendum. Should it do so, then CARICOM facilitation should cease immediately.
CARICOM has many eminently qualified leaders who could engage in such facilitation, including Trinidad and Tobago’s current President of the UN General Assembly, and an assortment of eminent Prime Ministers.
The road ahead is a perilous one: Guyana persists in its litigation before the ICJ, while Venezuela gets more and more riled up. It is an explosive situation. CARICOM facilitation could bring us back from the brink and maybe even lead to a mutually-agreed solution. Each side could gain from such a process.
If it does not work, then we will have gone the extra mile for peace. And the world will have seen this.
