Introduction Last week’s column wrapped-up the series of nine successive contributions arguing for the adoption by Guyana and Caricom, of the United Nations (UN) Post-2015 Development Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as their long-term planning and policy frameworks.
Fully supportive This column is the last in a series of nine successive columns devoted to addressing the United Nations (UN) Post-2015 Development Agenda and its related Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
In today’s column I shall start addressing the very last topic left in this extended series of discussions on the United Nations (UN) Post-2015 Development Agenda Summit and its related Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Introduction In the previous two columns, I have sought to make the case that, the major impediments, which are constraining the long-term socio-economic/environmental development, and structural transformation of the Region (and Guyana), can be effectively addressed within the framework of the United Nations (UN), Post-2015 Development Agenda and its related Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, 2015-2030).
Introduction In last week’s column, I began my response to a question that I have been asked repeatedly in recent times: that is, whether I believe the Sustainable Development Goals, (SDGs), which are slated to be adopted at the United Nations Summit later this month as an integral element of its Post-2015 Development Agenda, offer a sound and adequate planning framework for Caricom and Guyana’s long-term development over its projected life, 2015-30?
MDGs: Both necessary and sufficient Following on my previous columns that have been assessing the Post-2015 Development Agenda and its accompanying sustainable development goals (SDGs) 2015-2030, which is scheduled to be approved at the upcoming United Nations (UN) Summit (September 24-27) later this year, quite a few readers have asked me a rather pertinent question: whether I believe the SDGs,
Introduction In last week’s column, I sought to provide some insight into elements of the general approach adopted by the intergovernmental Open Working Group (OWG), which the United Nations (UN) had created to produce a Post-2015 Development Agenda that is to be agreed upon at the upcoming UN summit, to be held later in September of this year.
Introduction From Guyana’s perspective, today’s column continues to focus on an evaluation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2015-2030, their 169 targets and 304 indicators of compliance, which are scheduled to be agreed upon by all 193 member states of the United Nations (UN) at their upcoming summit on September 25-27 this year.
Introduction Last week’s column briefly reflected on the ongoing transitioning from the present era of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for global development (2010-2015), which expires this year to the upcoming Post-2015 Development Agenda that is presently being forged by the global community.
Introduction So far in this series of columns I have covered the international discussion taking place on steps to secure the recovery of stolen public assets leading up to the recently concluded Third Conference on Financing for Development (FFD), held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia last month.
Embedding Last week’s column concluded discussion of the hypothesis, which states, there is an ongoing paradigm shift in international mechanisms generating financing for development.
Introduction Last week’s column reported on the Third Financing for Development Conference and the positions it took in regard to the recovery of stolen public assets.
Introduction Hypothesis: Paradigm shift The hypothesis that has been under consideration in my July columns thus far, is that international best practices in the area of financing for development are undergoing a paradigm shift, which is partly reflected in mounting global efforts to incorporate “recovery of stolen public assets” (StPAR) as a central feature of domestic resource mobilization, particularly for developing countries.
Introduction The Third International Conference on Financing for Development has just concluded in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 to 16 July.
A background of crisis Last week I indicated that the first international conference on financing for development held in Monterrey, Mexico at the end of 2002 was a precursor to the launching by the United Nations of its global development agenda.
Introduction Last week I put forward the hypothesis that a paradigm shift is underway in international best practice in the area of financing for development.
Introduction As promised, today I continue discussing the topic: financing for development and its linkage to efforts directed at recovering stolen public assets belonging to Guyana.
Introduction Beginning with this brief introduction, in coming weeks I explore the linkage between initiatives to recover stolen public assets in Guyana and financing for its development.
Introduction Today’s column follows-up on 1) my earlier estimation of the value of potentially recoverable stolen public assets and 2) the ticking time-bombs that threaten the survival of sugar and rice.
Introduction Perhaps a window on public sentiment is reflected in the surprising number of persons that responded to last Sunday’s column, which linked the recovery of stolen public assets initiative to not so discreet intimations of destabilization of the sugar and rice industries.
Political economy fragility Today’s column elaborates on organizational elements, briefly portrayed last week, which are needed for establishing Guyana’s stolen public assets recovery initiative.
As part of the series on managing Guyana’s public investment regime, today’s column proposes a mechanism whereby our newly elected government could, at this unique democratic opening, embark on seeking bread (investible resources) and justice for Guyanese whose national wealth has been rapaciously plundered in recent years.
Introduction I was caught completely off-guard at the depth of the consternation and disbelief expressed by quite a few readers who responded to the estimates that I had provided of the amount of money Guyana loses due to three corrupt practices (public procurement fraud; illicit capital flight; and the underground economy) in last week’s column ($313billion or about US$1.5billion).
Shock and dismay Today’s lesson (4) continues identifying the orders of magnitude of corruption-linked economic haemorrhage currently taking place in Guyana.
Introduction After some introductory material, the lessons dealt with so far in this series on the management of Guyana’s public investment regime have concentrated on: 1) the “basic steps” needed to establish an adequately functioning organization of this regime and 2) the types of failures and weaknesses displayed in public projects during the 2000s.
Introduction Today’s column concludes my examination of project failures and weaknesses revealed in public investment management in Guyana during the 2000s.
Introduction Lesson 2 in the present series of SN columns was presented in two parts over successive weeks; the main content of which was summarized in two schedules carried in last week’s column.
As promised, this week’s column provides the second of a two-part lesson on the topic: organizing the management of Guyana’s public investment regime.
Introduction Last week I introduced the first in the present series of lessons explaining Guyana’s public investment management regime.
Introduction Surprisingly, considering what appears to be the public’s main preoccupations today, thus far I have already received an unusual number of queries concerning the notion of “pathological altruism”, which I had introduced in recent columns that discussed the Venezuelan PetroCaribe scheme.
Introduction As I write this concluding column on PetroCaribe, global crude oil prices have resumed their decline.
Introduction Today’s column, along with next week’s will concentrate on 1) an evaluation of the role the PetroCaribe initiative has been playing in the region’s regime of crude oil importation, since its establishment in 2005, and 2) an assessment of the near-to-medium prospects of this initiative, with special reference to Guyana’s membership.
Introduction: Lifeline or noose I shall outline the key details of the Venezuela PetroCaribe initiative in the next section of this column but upfront I wish to categorically assert that Guyana along with other members of this initiative have benefited greatly from it since its establishment in 2005 and for sure right up to the middle of 2014.
Introduction As indicated last week, in order to promote an intelligent appraisal of PetroCaribe and the current regime of Guyana’s oil importation, an appreciation of the trajectory of the current global crude oil price is essential.
Market price: demand and supply Today the PetroCaribe Agreement and Guyana’s oil importation has to be contextualized against the dramatic fall in the global price of oil, which started in mid-2014.
Introduction Last week’s column revealed that in 2015, even as Guyana approaches half a century of Independence, several classical features of its colonial economic structure remain intact by global standards.
Then and now Sadly, as we approach Republic Day 2015, and after about half a century of independence, the classic description of the Guyana colonial economy as very small (even micro by global standards), poor, highly open, and exceptionally dependent on trade in primary commodities remains as broadly accurate today as it was back then.
Part4 Introduction Today’s column concludes this four-part series on the Guyana state. On January 20 the President announced May 11 as the elections date.
So far Parts 1 & 2 of this four-part series of columns have argued that the proximate or immediately precipitating factor driving the multifaceted crises which have emerged in Guyana today, stems from the unprecedented torrent of financial lawlessness, abuses and irregularities unleashed by the minority PPP/C executive, which came into office following the November 2011 national elections.
Part2 Introduction Last week, in Part 1 of this four-part series of columns I had argued that the proximate or immediately preceding factor driving the several ongoing crises and threatening contradictions in Guyana (starkly symbolized in the presidential prorogation of the National Assembly on November 10, 2014) has been the uncontrolled torrent of financial abuses, irregularities, and lawlessness perpetrated by the PPP/C executive since the November 2011 elections.
Part1 Introduction There is a connecting thread to Guyana’s ongoing narrative of multiple unfolding crises, major economic contradictions, and threats of state violence against government critics.
This week’s column concludes the discussion of inequality and poverty in Guyana. It focuses on the moral and ethical aspects of these phenomena.
Introduction As promised last week, today’s column begins with a brief report on the only recent study that I know of, which provides a quantitative measure of the direct impact of the global economy on poverty and inequality within nations.
There are two crucial issues which remain to be tackled in this series on inequality and poverty in contemporary Guyana.
Introduction This week I complete my presentation of Piketty’s recent paradigm- shifting contribution to the study of income and wealth inequality (Capital in the 21st Century), which I had introduced last week.
Introduction Last week’s column sought to make it very clear that, in my view, Guyana’s burgeoning inequality and poverty are the direct products of decisions and collective choices made by the ruling cabal of politicians, controllers of criminal networks, economic and financial rogues, and other marauders, who as I have indicated, consider themselves not only ‘too big to jail’ but also destined by the gods to rule Guyana.
In today’s column I propose to take last week’s discussion concerning the impact of massive wage and salary spreads along with the prevalence of the phantom economy on Guyana’s inequality and poverty one step further, through engaging an important emerging global line of thought on these matters.
Absolute v relative poverty This week I shall follow up on three matters related to last week’s discussion of poverty and inequality in the context of Guyana’s growth, joblessness and the minimum wage.
Introduction Over the past two weeks I have been displaying a Table that I had specifically constructed for this series indicating: 1) the annual public sector nominal minimum wage increases announced by government for the years 2006 to 2013.When these are adjusted for annual price increases (inflation) it is revealed these increases had only grown annually by about one percent on average.
Introduction Last week I introduced a Table showing that, over the eight years 2006 to 2013, the average net annual increase in the public sector minimum wage (adjusted for annual inflation) was shockingly low, about one percent.